For Metinvest, 2026 has been one of the worst years in its history. Metinvest is Ukraine’s largest privately owned company and is controlled by the country’s wealthiest businessman, Rinat Akhmetov.
The EU, the Group’s key market, is restricting imports of Ukrainian steel and has introduced the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM). In August and September, russia launched attacks on the Group’s Kamet Steel and Zaporizhstal plants, forcing them to suspend operations. In addition, russia has blocked Ukrainian seaports. According to GMK Centre, in the first half of 2026, 50% of steel, 95% of pig iron and 50% of iron ore exports were shipped through seaports.
Last year, the Group’s revenues increased by 6% year on year to US$7.24 billion, while its net loss fell to around one-sixth of the previous year’s level, at US$191 million.
Attacks on Kamet Steel and Zaporizhstal
— What is the current situation with your assets?
—Central Iron Ore and Northern Iron Ore are operating at 50% capacity. They produce pellets and high-quality iron ore concentrate, which we sell to the EU.
Southern Iron Ore, a joint venture with our partners, is currently idle due to the closure of Ukrainian ports. Inhulets Iron Ore has been idled since 2024 because high electricity prices make production there economically unviable. The asset has been properly mothballed, and we will be able to resume production if market conditions become favourable.
— Iron ore is currently trading at around US$100. At what price would restarting production make economic sense?
— We would need a price of at least US$135-150 per tonne of iron ore concentrate. We are not seeing prices at those levels at present, and none of the forecasts indicate a sustained positive trend in the market. We are therefore forced to keep the asset mothballed.
— What about the steelmaking segment?
— Both Kamet Steel and Zaporizhstal are currently undergoing recovery work and debris clearance following the attacks on these assets in August and September.
Unfortunately, 13 people were killed in these attacks: both our employees and employees of contractors working at the sites. More than 40 people were injured. We are trying to support everyone: the families of those who were killed, as well as those who were injured, are receiving the necessary assistance from the Group.
— You have strict safety measures in place: when an air-raid alert is issued, employees are required to go to shelters. How, then, did employees lose their lives?
— We have safety protocols in place, and all sites have shelters. However, these were ballistic missile strikes. Eleven ballistic missiles were launched at Zaporizhstal and five at Kamet Steel.
[Note from Metinvest’s press service: the interview was recorded before another attack on Zaporizhstal, which took place during the night of 12 September. A further four ballistic missiles struck the plant, injuring four employees.]
There are only two minutes between an air-raid alert and the impact of a ballistic missile. A person simply does not have enough time to reach a safe location once the alert begins. At the time of the strike, people were in fact making their way to shelters.
While we are setting up additional shelters so that we can also respond to the ballistic missile threat, this is a serious challenge: how to ensure the safety of people working directly at production sites within such a short timeframe.
When it comes to guided aerial bombs, or KABs, we know that, in the case of Zaporizhzhia, there are around 10-15 minutes between the start of an alert and the time they reach the city. People therefore have time to move safely to shelters. All distances are calculated so that employees can reach them within five to seven minutes.
— Do FPV drones also pose a risk?
— For Zaporizhzhia, the main threats are KABs, ballistic missiles and jet-powered drones. While FPV drones occasionally reach the area, they do not cause significant damage. As for Kryvyi Rih, there have been cases of KABs reaching the city, but fortunately this is currently rare.
If the enemy continues to upgrade KABs and extend their range, they may begin reaching Kryvyi Rih as well.
— How many employees were at the production sites at the time of the strikes?
— The total workforce at Zaporizhstal is 8,500 people, while Kamet Steel employs around 8,000. They work in shifts, so around 2,500-3,000 people are present at the plants at any one time.
— How do you assess the cost of restoring Zaporizhstal?
— Full restoration of the fixed assets that were damaged would cost tens of millions [of dollars]. In practical terms, the plant’s production chain has been disrupted.
— Will the assets be restored by the end of the year?
— I do not want to comment on that at this stage because our people and project teams are still working on it. As soon as we have a clear understanding of how long the restoration will take and what equipment will be required, we will determine the timeframe.
— Two assets have been taken out of operation for an indefinite period. What happens to the contracts you were due to fulfil?
— For some contracts, we are invoking force majeure because this genuinely is a force majeure situation. We then discuss with our counterparties whether to extend the contractual deadlines or cancel the contracts altogether.
— What sort of sums are we talking about?
— I would rather not disclose the amounts. These are contracts worth millions of dollars.
— I am trying to assess the scale of the losses for the Group…
— The steel industry as a whole used to account for up to 7% of Ukraine’s GDP. Now that figure may be close to zero. That gives you an idea of the scale of the losses.
Impact of the port blockade
— How severely has the port blockade affected you, and how much export revenues will Ukraine miss out on as a result?
— In fact, this is the main problem. Without open ports, even restored assets will not be able to operate at full capacity.
Southern Iron Ore has been idled. It used to export up to 1 million tonnes of iron ore every month. Northern Iron Ore and Central Iron Ore exported around another 0.5 million tonnes through the ports. That is 1.5 million tonnes a month that can no longer be exported through the ports, before you even add steel products.
— How much has the port blockade affected your ability to import coal?
— After operations at our Pokrovsk assets were suspended, we had to import around 250,000 tonnes a month. While certain grades come by rail from the Czech Republic and Poland, the vast majority used to arrive through Ukrainian ports. Ships would unload at the Greater Odesa ports and would then be loaded, for example, with iron ore concentrate for export. All of that has now stopped.
We have switched all our coke plants to the longest possible coking cycles. While we are bringing in everything we can by rail or through Polish ports and Constanța, this raises the logistics cost of the coal by 50-60%.
— Before the steel plants were shut down, was this logistics model still profitable?
— The margin was close to zero.
— Last year, the EU accounted for around 43% of your sales. How have sales to the EU changed as a result of CBAM and the quotas?
— Because of the port blockade, the EU is currently the only market to which we can export our products. Other markets are effectively closed to us because logistics costs are too high. Occasionally, when market conditions are favourable, we ship pig iron to the US via Poland.
Since April, the EU has introduced quotas on mining and metals products, allowing exports equivalent to half of last year’s volume: 1 million tonnes.
The quotas apply to finished products with higher added value, such as coil, rebar and wire rod. Semi-finished products, such as billets, are not subject to quotas.
— Several factors have coincided: the port blockade, attacks on production facilities and higher domestic logistics tariffs. How much more difficult is the situation for the Group now compared with 2022, when you lost the Mariupol steel plants?
— I will be frank: in 2022-2023, the Group still had a financial safety margin built up during the pre-war years. Today, that safety margin is gone. And not only for us: no company has one left.
Without state support and assistance from international partners, we simply will not be able to stay afloat.
— What kind of support do you need specifically?
— We are dealing with closed ports, higher tariffs and large-scale attacks on industrial facilities. This is not limited to Metinvest assets: as you can see, practically all of Ukraine’s major producers have been affected.
The energy sector has funds that provide financing for reconstruction following attacks. For steelmakers and other industries, however, no such funds exist at all; there is not even any discussion about creating them.
Such funds should exist because steelmaking is a major export-oriented industry that has always been a reliable taxpayer.
If the ports are not operating, the cost of domestic freight transport cannot be increased at the same time. Ukrzaliznytsia is effectively shooting itself in the foot: the more it raises tariffs, the less efficient it becomes.
Look at how heavily our roads are now used by lorries carrying grain and other cargo. Freight will gradually shift to other modes of transport.
There is another problem at Ukrzaliznytsia that few people talk about: there is no systemic solution to ensure sufficient locomotive capacity for stable freight operations within 150 km of the front line.
To protect its equipment, the railway operator is moving locomotives further away from the main industrial regions, including Dnipro and Zaporizhzhia. If the situation is not brought under control, there may come a point when Ukrzaliznytsia is no longer able to cope with these challenges on its own and, as a result, is physically unable to transport freight.
— How do you see this problem being resolved?
— We need a plan to ensure stable rail freight operations under wartime conditions, and that work needs to begin now. This can only be achieved through the fullest possible use of both Ukrzaliznytsia’s own locomotive repair facilities and contracts with companies in the EU. In addition, international grant funding is needed to purchase new locomotives under the principle of a “Railway Ramstein”: modelled on the way military assistance is coordinated and consolidated.
Cost and workforce reductions
— How much have your production costs increased compared with last year?
— By around 30%. This is mainly due to logistics and electricity prices. It is a substantial increase in costs and prevents us from planning major investments. We are effectively operating in standby mode.
— If Zaporizhstal and Kamet Steel cannot be restored for a prolonged period, or if they are restored and then hit again, how long can the Group continue operating with just two mining and processing plants in Ukraine?
— We are doing everything within our power to keep the Group afloat. Unfortunately, we will have to take unpopular measures: cut costs as far as possible, reduce headcount and take other steps necessary to sustain the Group through this difficult period and subsequently ensure its recovery and further development.
— How significant will the workforce reductions be, and who will be affected first?
— We are still considering this, so I cannot yet say what the reduction will be in percentage terms, but it will be substantial because we need to reduce the financial burden.
First and foremost, this concerns administrative staff and our use of contractors in our operations. For example, we may increase the workload of our own employees by assigning them work currently carried out by contractors. After that, we will assess where we have surplus staffing and decide whether those employees should be made redundant or reassigned to other processes.
— What else is included in the package of crisis measures?
— In two words: cost reduction.
— By how much will the investment programme be reduced?
— We have already cancelled some projects that had not yet started. However, we are now in the second half of the year: a significant amount of equipment was purchased in the first two quarters, and some of the work has already been completed.
We have just completed repairs to blast furnace No. 1 at Kamet Steel, which was hit in an attack. Therefore, there will not be a significant reduction this year: no more than 15-20%. We will adjust our plans for next year.
— You have built more than 20 MW of gas-fired generation capacity and were planning to double that capacity, as well as build a solar power plant. Are those plans still going ahead?
— They are on hold for now.
— Do you see potential to increase sales within Ukraine?
— While the potential is there, it is not being realised. The problem is that Ukraine does not protect its domestic market. For example, it is buying increasing volumes of pipes from Türkiye. In practice, this means that Ukraine is buying russian steel, because Turkish producers roll coil from cheap russian slab.
In other words, our partners in the EU provide us with funding to support the economy, while Ukraine spends that money paying russia for its steel through imports. A remarkable business model.
— Why does Ukraine not introduce duties?
— It is difficult for me to answer that question. While the EU and the US promptly apply anti-dumping instruments to protect their own producers, in Ukraine, trade protection measures for the domestic market take years to approve. In the meantime, dumped imports are displacing Ukrainian products even in our own market. We continue to raise this issue and say: give us the opportunity to increase production. We will pay more taxes and create jobs.
Interpipe could produce more pipes instead of importing them from Türkiye, while we could supply Interpipe with more rolled steel from Zaporizhstal. In other words, we already have a functioning production chain that is not being used to its full potential.
CBAM, quotas and international assets
— Unlike Ukraine, the EU protects its domestic market. How has the introduction of CBAM affected you?
— Payments have been deferred for a year, so in practice we have not yet felt their full impact. The mechanism for calculating these payments is also still being developed. However, this could become a significant additional burden: from EUR50 to EUR100 per tonne of rolled steel, while its market price is around US$600. This would make Ukrainian products uncompetitive in the EU. In addition, the introduction of this levy has pushed back the environmental modernisation of Ukraine’s steel industry by years.
— But the levy is payable by the importer.
— Yes, the importer pays it, but they still reduce the price they are prepared to pay us for the product to offset the additional cost. As a result, we are forced to sell at a significant discount. In many cases, the customer also asks us to assume the import-related risks. In those cases, we act as the official importer of our own products into certain EU countries and are required to pay the levy ourselves.
— What is your assessment: is this something the Group can live with? Is there a chance it could be revised?
— The transition to green steelmaking is irreversible and will happen in any case. However, as a country at war, we would still like to see some form of transition period. All our competitors in the EU have access to state financing programmes, support for restructuring their production facilities and access to credit.
We are in a significantly worse position. No one is going to provide Kamet Steel, for example, with a loan today to build a DRI module and an electric arc furnace. As a result, we have no access to financial markets and no ability to place orders for the necessary equipment. however, when it comes to these payments, we are subject to the same conditions as producers in the EU.
All we are asking of the EU at this stage is a deferral of the levy. At a minimum, we would like a two- to three-year deferral after the war ends. Ideally, Ukrainian producers should be granted a ten-year transition period, because the shift to green steelmaking is a long-term investment project.
— How realistic is it to secure such a deferral?
— Nothing is impossible. We simply need our partners to start listening to us and to meet us halfway, because without access to their market it will be difficult for us to survive. For some reason, they continue to allow imports of cheap goods from China and Türkiye.
Türkiye, for example, is currently dumping across multiple product categories: pipes, coils and rebar. How does this dumping work? Turkish producers buy cheap russian slab, process it into pipes and flood markets, including the Ukrainian market, with these low-cost products.
For some reason, the EU is seeking to protect itself primarily at Ukraine’s expense. russian semi-finished products continue to be purchased just as they were before.
This effectively amounts to a policy of double standards. At the same time, I do not believe that 1 million tonnes of Ukrainian steel represents a threat to the EU market.
— What about the quotas? What are the chances of having them revised? Are the quotas supposed to be reviewed annually?
— We are currently in negotiations. We are trying to have them set at 2025 or 2024 levels and to secure the volumes that Ukraine had previously supplied to the EU market.
— You are in contact with Ukraine’s economic ministries, as well as EU politicians and industry associations. What are they telling you? How realistic is an increase in the quotas?
— First and foremost, we are working with Ukraine’s Ministry of Economy. We have its support, joint programmes are in place, and we share the same ultimate objective. That is one strand of our work. The other, of course, is negotiations with EU authorities to communicate our position. The EU could simply redistribute the quotas and, by doing so, support the Ukrainian economy.
There are many examples of why this matters. Our new Romanian plant in Iași, for instance, was intended to operate as a remote production facility for Zaporizhstal, helping to keep our Ukrainian assets running.
However, following the introduction of the quotas, this model became unviable. The plant may now have to stop operating. It employs around 250 people, with roughly the same number working for contractors. That is why we are stressing to the Romanian government that this could become a problem for them as well: a tax-paying enterprise that provides jobs may have to shut down.
— How much did you pay for the plant?
— We acquired it for EUR10 million. In fact, it was meeting our expectations until the quotas were introduced. When we took over the site in January, it had an administrative team and around 150 employees. We began recruiting and training additional staff and got all the operational processes up and running.
— Can you explain why you cannot supply rolled steel to your own plant in Romania, given that the quota has not yet been exhausted?
— The quota forces us to choose where we can send our products to achieve the highest returns because our export opportunities are limited.
The Polish market can absorb all our coil at a higher price, so it is more efficient for us to supply it there than to ship it to Romania, process it and then sell the resulting pipes.
Before the quotas were introduced, Romania had been one of the alternatives to southern export destinations such as the Middle East and North Africa.
— Are your other European assets also dependent on Kamet Steel and Zaporizhstal? What is the situation there?
— The situation is somewhat easier there. Promet Steel in Bulgaria, for example, purchases billets from Kamet Steel, and this semi-finished product is subject to neither duties nor quotas. Our assets in Italy and the UK purchase slabs from external suppliers because Ukraine has had no slab production since the loss of Mariupol.
— Has your expansion into the EU market and the acquisition of additional assets now been put on hold?
— Given the current circumstances, yes. We are focused simply on getting through the situation we are in. The objective is to survive.
— You are selling your coal business in the US. What stage has the transaction reached?
— We are in the final stage of the sale.